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414 SPRAGUE v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. Co:r.r. [46 C.2d 
the resolution shows unquestioned by the 
board of Earhart as a public road. 
To reach the conclusion arrived at 
above cited cases must be overruled. 
tinguished. 
by the majority, the 
They cannot be dis-
The rule for which the majority stands may have more 
serious effects than are present here. Suppose all the things 
done by the city here are done on a strip of land owned by 
the city and in reliance thereon millions of dollars of im-
provements are erected fronting on it. It would seem incon-
ceivable that this court would hold there was no dedication, 
would permit the city to erect barriers across the street and 
stop the flow of traffic thereon rendering valueless the invest-
ments in the improvements. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 19386. In Bank. May 1, 1956.] 
BARBARA LEE SPRAGUE, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACOIDEN'r COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-New and 
Further Disability.-The Industrial Accident Commission cor-
rectly determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain 
a petition for increased disability rating filed more than five 
years after the date of injury, though the injured employee 
filed a prior petition for further medical treatment within the 
five-year period, where it was not suggested on the hearing of 
that petition that she was seeking an increased permanent 
disability rating because of any new and further disability, 
where notwithstanding a recital in such petition that she had 
"suffered from increased disability and pain" it was stipulated 
that the "only question" raised was the "need for further 
medical treatment," and where she did not thereafter claim, 
by petition for reconsideration or for judicial review, that any 
issue that had been raised had been left undetermined. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission dismissing petition for increased disability 
rating. Order affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 134; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 409. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 141. 
L 
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& Bamford and Bamford 
A. Corten. Daniel C. Murphy, Leonard, Hanna & 
Edmond G. Leonard for Respondents. 
J.-Petitioner seeks annulment of an order of 
c·ommission her "Petition for 
Disability Rating," ·which order was made upon the 
of "v;ant of jurisdiction." 
a witness, was suffering from a preexisting, 
"cong·enital defect in the fifth lumbar process 
with a spondylolisthesis," at the time that she fell 
position on ,January 1, 1949. She did not immedi-
" notiee any particular pain," and she continued her 
until the following month. Since leaving her work, there 
hn;;: been a serious dispute as to whether her difficulties at any 
time have resulted from her preexisting, progressive 
or the fall, or both. She was given a temporary dis-
award on February 27, 1950. That award was termi-
September 7, 1950, with a reservation of the issue 
disability for later determination. In 1951 her 
disability rating was fixed by the commission at 
cent. No part of her disability was apportioned to her 
permanent disability,'' as the referee found no 
of ''work disability from the pre-existing physical 
'' Reconsideration ·was granted but the award was con-
firmed on J nne 11, 1952. The referee's report upon which the 
commission acted stated: ''Concerning the question of appor-
whether this should or should not be done is a deci-
eomp1etely within the province of either the Referee or 
Commission. This Referee feels that the disinclination or 
of the Referee to apportion was proper.'' Petitioner 
i hereafter filed in 1953 a ''Petition for Further Medical Treat-
which was denied on July 27, 1954. The present 
for Increased Disability Rating" was filed on Feb-
1955, and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on 
1955. 
As the date of the injury was ,January 1, 1949, and 
"Petition for Increased Disability Rating" was not filed 
February 25, 1955, being more than six years after the 
injury, we are of the opinion that the commission cor-
determined that it was without jurisdiction to enter-
(Lab. Code, §§ 5804, 5410.) 
[46 
Increased 
increased 
raised in appli-
cant '' She claims that lwr ''Petition for 
Purther 1\Iedical 'l'reatment," :filed within the five-year period, 
raised the issue that the original had caused ''new and 
further ' within the of section 5410 of the 
Ijabor and that the commission therefore had juris-
diction to hear and determine her petition for an increased 
permanent disability rating after the expiration of the five-
year period. (DougLas A·ircraft Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
31 Cal.2d 853 [193 P.2d 468] ; Gobel v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
1 Cal.2d 100 [33 P.2d 413]; Westvaco etc. Corp. v. Ind1tstrial 
Ace. Com., 136 Cal.App.2d 60 [288 P.2d 300] ; lhtrness 
Pacific, Ltd. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 74 Cal.App.2d 324 [168 
P.2d 761].) vYe are of the opinion, however, that the cited 
authorities do not sustain petitioner's position here. 
Petitioner's prior petition was entitled ''Petition for Fur-
ther Medical 'l'reatment,'' and it prayed only for an order 
requiring the furnishing of ''further medical treatment.'' 
Said petition was denied in its entirety and without qualifica-
tion by an order reading ''Applicant's Petition for Further 
Medical Treatment, filed herein on November 24, 1953, is 
denied." It was not sug·gested upon the hearing of that peti-
tion that petitioner was seeking an increased permanent dis-
ability rating because of any "new and further disability." 
On the contrary, her counsel agreed at the time of the hearing 
that the "only question" was that of "need for further 
medical treatment." It appeared that petitioner had discon-
tinued the use of a recommended support, and there was med-
ical testimony showing that the use of a support was the only 
appropriate treatment. The testimony of one doctor, who 
had only recently examined petitioner and who advocated a 
spinal fusion, was rejected by the commission. Petitioner 
sought neither reconsideration nor judicial review, and the 
order of denial became final. 
If there is merit in petitioner's contention that under a 
liberal construction of her ''Petition for Further Medical 
'l'reatment, '' it might be treated as sufficient to raise the claim 
of a "new and further disability" by reason of a recital 
i herein that she had ''suffered from increased disability and 
pain,'' it is a conclusive answer that it was stipulated at the 
lH•aring that the only issue raised was the ''need for further 
SPRAGUE v. l:xDUSTRIAr, Ace. CoM. 
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417 
itirnwr dii1 not tlwt·caftcr 
ition for reeon:-;ideration or for 
issue tlmi had br;en rai;;ed had }wen left undctcr-
UlHler Uwse <·iremnstanees petitioner eaunot now eon-
attribrttc to her prior petition the widest possible 
for jurisdictional purposes, and at the same tinw 
the unqualified denial of that petition the same 
for the same purposes. 
P<A.it ioner 's cited authorities are readily distinguishable. In 
none of those cases had the petition, filed within the five-year 
been unqualifiedly denied by the commission after a 
upon the merits. In Gobel v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
1 Cal.2d 100, the petition was admittedly filed two 
before the expiration of the prescribed time, and was 
dismissed without a hearing on the ground of lack 
of jurisdiction. lt was there held that the commission had 
j l!risdiction to determine the merits of the petition after the 
·"·'"'"·u time, as the petition had been filed within the pre-
time. The same principle was applied in Furness 
Ltd. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 
:324. In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Ind1iStrial Ace. Com., supra, 
31 CaL2d 853, the commission stated, in making its prior 
a\Yard upon a petition timely filed, that "Applicant's con-
dition is not yet stationary and permanent, and jurisdiction 
is reserved to determine extent of permanent disability 
... upon request of any party in interest." (P. 855.) In 
w~.~tuaco etc. Corp. v. Ind1iStrial Ace. Com., S1rpm, 136 CaL 
60, the commission similarly stated in making its prior 
that "Applicant's condition is not stationary, and a 
in respect to the nature and extent of disability, 
or permanent, or both, is not being made at this 
and jurisdiction is hereby reserved to re-determine said 
at a later date." (P. 61.) No comparable situation is 
by the record before us, as the only petition filed 
here within the prescribed time had been denied after a 
on the merits, and the commission's unqualified order 
of denial had become final. 
'While the courts have properly given a liberal construction 
to the sections establishing jurisdictional limitations upon the 
po1ver of the commission (Lab. Code, §§ 5804, 5410), we can-
not hold here that any proceeding was left pending and 
undetermined before the commission after the time that the 
commission's unqualified order of denial of petitioner's prior 
petition became finaL 'l'lw "Petitioll for ln<·rNlSi'<l Disability 
46 C.2d-14 
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'' must therefore be treated as an inclependent petition 
for that purpose, and as it was admittedly filed more than six 
years after the date of the commission correctly deter-
mined that it had no jurisdiction to entertain said petition. 
(Lab. § 
The order is affirmed. 
and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
J.-I dissent. 
The holding of the majority here is a far cry from the 
liberal construction of the vV orkmen 's Compensation Act 
made mandatory by its provisions (Lab. Code, § 3202). 
It should be noted that the majority opinion in its state-
ment of facts seeks to reargue an issue of fact which has 
been long since finally settled. Attention is called to the 
fact that Mrs. Sprague had a preexisting spinal defect and 
that there was a serious dispute as to whether her difficulties 
were caused by reason of her employment. Inasmuch as she 
had been awarded a permanent disability rating of 31 per 
cent, it appears certain that the commission found her dis-
ability to be employment connected. We have held in the 
past, and only just recently, that industry takes the employee 
as it finds him (except as provided for in section 4750 of the 
Labor Code; Srnith v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 44 Cal.2d 364 
[282 P.2d 64]; Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Ace. 
Corn., 44 Cal.2d 604 [283 P.2d 1039]) and that he is entitled 
to compensation for disability proximately caused by in-
dustrial injury regardless of whether the employee's condi-
tion at the time of injury was average or subnormal. (Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 73 Cal.App.2d 555 
[166 P.2d 908] ; Assom:ated Indern. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. 
Corn., 120 Cal.App.2d 423 [261 P.2d 25].) The majority 
opinon concedes that the commission here refused an appor-
tionment under section 4750. Hence the question of Mrs. 
Sprague's preexisting ailment and its bearing on her present 
condition had been concluded prior to the petition under 
consideration here. 
The rule is that the nature of a pleading will be determined 
from its allegations or averments regardless of the title it 
bears (Standard Brands of Calif. v. Bryce, 1 Cal.2d 718 
[37 P.2d 446] ; Luckey v. Superior Cottrt, 209 Cal. 360, 365 
[287 P. 450]; Weber v. Sttperior Court, 26 Cal.2d 144, 148 
OJ 
p 
p 
t 
n 
v 
j 
1 
SPRAGUE v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. 
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61 
v. Veach, 59 
; Hutchason v. Marks, 54 
) . 
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an industrial injury on 
1952, she was awarded further 
of 31 per 
This award was confirmed following reconsideration on 
1952. In 1 filed a '' Peti-
Further Medical Treatment'' in which she stated 
had '' sufrered from increased disability and pain.'' 
time of the hearing on Ma/ 12, 1954, there was no dis-
that Mrs. Sprague's disability had substantially in-
since the rating made in 1952 but there was a dispute 
the treatment to be accorded her. Petitioner's 
surgeon ·was of the opinion that a spinal fusion 
should be undertaken prior to a re-evaluation of the case; 
' orthopedic surgeon was of the opinion that she 
be accorded only palliative, conservative care. In an 
order dated July 15, 1954, it was ordered that "Applicant's 
for Fudher JJiedical Treatment, filed herein No-
wmber 24, 1953, is denied." (Emphasis added.) Some few 
months thereafter Mrs. Sprague requested a hearing on her 
for an increased disability rating ''as previously 
in her last petition'' which was denied on the ground 
the commission lacked jurisdiction to proceed. The ques-
therefore, whether the petition for further medical 
treatment filed within the time limited raised the issue of 
MnL Sprague's "new and further disability" within the 
of section 5410 of the Labor Code. The majority 
holds that the issue was not raised, that the commission lost 
and that the matter of further disability could 
considered. I definitely do not agree with this holding. 
is well settled that the commission has power to de-
termine new and further disability beyond the five-year 
where application is made within that period. (Gobel 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 1 Cal.2d 100 [33 P.2d 413] ; Douglas 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 31 Cal.2d 853 [193 P.2d 
; Broadway-Locust Co. v. Industrial ilcc. Com., 92 Cal. 
287 [206 P.2d 8561; Pacific Inclem. Co. v. IndustTial 
Com .. 85 Cal.App.2d 490 r193 P.2d 1171; Fnrness 
Ltd. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 74 Ca1.App.2d 324 
420 SPHAGVE 1'. I"nu~THIAL Ace. CoM. r 46 c.2d 
; West vaco etc. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
60 P.2d ~100] .) 
When in November, 1953, Mrs. Sprague petitioned for 
further medical treatment she raised the issue of the fact of 
her increased permanent disability-a fact which was never 
disputed. At the time of her petition, it was felt by her and 
her surgeon that a certain type of surgery might 
relien~ hee com1ition and cure her disability. Any deter-
mination by the commission as to the issue of further dis-
ability could not be made until after it had been determined 
whether surgery would cure her disability. Once the com-
mission determined that surgery was not the answer, then 
the issne of new and further disability remained for de-
termination. It is this determination which the majority 
has concluded cannot be made, despite the fact that the only 
thing done by the eommission was to deny Mrs. Sprague's 
request for ''further medical treatment.'' After the denial 
of further medical treatment, Mrs. Sprague filed a "Petition 
for Increased Permanent Disability Rating" which reads as 
follows: ''Comes now applicant, Barbara Lee Sprague, and 
respectfully requests that this matter be set down for hear-
ing in San ,Jose, California, on the issue of increased perma-
nent disability rating, as previously raised in applicant's 
last petition, and based upon the medical evidence adduced 
on the hearing on said petition, together with further testi-
mony and medical evidence to be adduced herein." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The majority states that it was stipulated at the hearing 
that the only issue raised was the "need for further medical 
treatment" but then states that "petitioner did not thereafter 
claim, by petition for reconsideration or for judicial review, 
that any issue that had been raised had bren left undeter-
mined.'' I have just pointed out how, after her request for 
further medical treatment was denied, prtitioner requested an 
increased permanent disability rating "as previously raised 
in applicant's l,ast petition." (Emphasis added.) The only 
issue before thr commission was whether or not surgery would 
take care of Mrs. Sprague's admittrd fnrther disability-if 
it would not, then it was undenied ihat her increased disability 
was permanent. 1'lms it is dear that the issue of increased 
permanent disability was before the commission. T t had to be 
before the commission, since, if the request for surgery were 
denied, the issue of the rating to be given her for increased 
Co:.r. 421 
548! 
r , o;o J\Irs. 
tioocod for n'<·om;ideration or for jwh:inl n·view or 
inereased di:-;ability rating within the time limitn<l since 
was no way she eould know what ad.ion the eommi::;sion 
take on her petition. l\Ioreover, she was apparently 
to accept the determination of the eommission that 
medieal treatment would not enre her disability. 
of 1Vcstvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial A.cc. Cow., 
GO [288 P.2d 300], the majority opiuion says: 
eomparable situation is presented by the record before us, 
only petition filed here within the prescribed time had 
been denied after a hearing on the merits, and the commis-
unqualified order of denial had become finaL'' 'l'be 
of the order of the commission has uothi11g to do with 
the faets of this ease sinee the only thing dt~nied by the eom-
was further medieal treatment for Mrs. Sprague and 
this denial took plaee after the expiration of the period 
Since the essenee of the majority opinion is simply 
llwt since Mrs. Sprague did not speeifieally request an in-
disability rating at the same time she made her request 
fl)r medieal treatment she is foreYer foreelosed from request-
an inerrase in her disability rating even though it iR 
admitted by all that her disability has inereased. It would 
that this is far short of the liberal eonstruetion made 
by the Labor Code so that the ''purpose of extend-
. benefits for the protection of persons injured in the 
of their employment" might be achieved. (I1ab. Code, 
~ ;)20~.) \Vhen teehniealities are employed to dl'prive working 
men and women of the benefits to which they are entitled, 
substantial justice is not being aeeomplished. 
am of the opinion that the language used in W cstvaco 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 13G CaLApp.2cl GO, G-J. 
P.2d 300], is applicable to the ease at bar even though 
\Vestvaeo ease jurisdietion was expressly reserved. 'l'he 
there said that the aetion of the eommission "while not 
revoking the first order, had the effeet of taking from 
final eharaeter. From then on there was no effeetive 
of permanent disability; in effect, the original finding 
was set aside .... [I] f the eommission, proeeeding under 
section 5410, should find that there was new and further dis-
it eould then make an award therefor. This latter 
422 SPRAGUE INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. C.2d 
award could be made after the of the five-year 
as the for it bad been filed within that period." 
'rhe commission, in the case before us, had the of Mrs. 
Sprague for increased disability before it, but determined 
that further medical treatment would be of no avail and 
therefore denied that open the matter 
rating. Mrs. 's claim of in-
creased was not denied-therefore, that was 
one of and the stipulation mentioned in the majority 
opnuon would have no effect any more than a stipulation 
agreeing to a court's jurisdiction when there was a total lack 
thereof. 
In Consolidated Steel Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 6 Cal.2d 
368, 369 [57 P.2d 919], a self-insured steel company sought 
to annul an award of the commission where the injured person 
had filed ''an application for adjustment of his claim for 
further attention and treatment'' after an injured finger had 
healed in a deformed shape with loss of function. The court 
there said, in answering the contention that the claim was 
barred by section 11 of the act ''not having been commenced 
within six months of the injury or of the last payment of 
compensation or benefits'' that the evidence showed such a 
new and further disability as to bring the injured person 
within ''subdivision (c) of section 11 so as to extend the period 
within which we might make application to 245 weeks after 
the date of the injury." (See also Annstrong v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 219 Cal. 673 [28 P.2d 672] .) 
.1.\ fair and just interpretation of the record in this case 
is that in November, 1953, Mrs. Sprague filed a petition which 
embraced both a claim for further medical treatment and a 
further disability rating; that the commission heard only the 
issue relating to further medical treatment and denied this 
portion of the petition; that Mrs. Sprague thereafter on Feb-
ruary 25, 1955, requested the commission to hear and deter-
mine the portion of her petition relating to increased perma-
nent disability rating. There is no question and it is not 
disputed that Mrs. Sprague had suffered increased disability 
which she sought to have corrected by further medical treat-
ment. There was a dispute as to whether further medical 
treatment was advisable and the commission denied her re-
quest for this relief, leaving her request for an increased 
permanent disability rating undisposed of. 
The issue of increased permanent disability having been 
CoNTINENTAL CAs. Co. v. PHOENIX CoNSTR. Co. 423 
[46 C.2d 423; 296 P.2d 8011 
to determine 
therefore annul the order. 
concurred. 
A. No. 23225. In Bank. 
com-
4 
' 
C(l:\TTNENTAIJ CASUALTY COMPANY Corporation), 
v. PHOENIX CONS'l'RUC'l'ION COlVIP ANY 
(a Corporation) et al., Defendants and HeApondents; 
UNDEI{WRITEHS AT LI_.OYD'S, LONDON (an Un-
Assoeiation) ei al., Interveners and Re-
Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Right of 
Recoupment.-\Vhere a judgment has bern rendered against 
employer for damages occasioned by the unauthorized negli-
act of his employe, the employer may recoup his loss 
action against the negligent employe; ns betwePn em-
and employe in such a situation, the obligation of the 
is primary and that of the employer secondary. 
1 Disapproving nny contrary implil·ntions in Co11.~·Jlirluterl 8/iip-
v. Pacific B. Ins. Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 288, 293, 114 P.2cl 
; Air etc. Co. v. ErnployeTs' Liub. etc. Co1·p., 91 Cal.App.2d 
1:32, 204 P.2d 647; Employers etc. Corp. v. Pacific etc. Ins. 
102 Cal.App.2rl 188, 192, 227 P.2d 53; 'mrl Tmder8 etc. 
Co. v. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co., 130 Cal.App.2d 158, 165-166, 
P.2r1 4!13.) 
See Cal.Jur., l\Iaster and Servant, § 68; Am.Jur., ~faster and 
§ 101. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] l\!Iaster and Servant, §209; [2] 
ln~urance, § 2:3:3; [:3] Insurance, § :301; [ 4, 12] Insurance, § 60; 
§ 67; [6] Contracts, § 140; [7] Insurance, § 140; 
§ 161; [9 J Automobiles, § 4; [10] Automobiles, § 68; 
u~tua.1u;e. § 62; [1:3] Automobiles,~§ 68-1, 68-10; [14] Auto-
§ 68-l; [lfi] AppPal and Error, § 1230(2); [16] Appeal 
§ 1429. 
